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range of services, traditionally available on desktop computers, accessible to mobile users, irrespective of
their location. Providing adequate security for these phones and the services that they offer is a central
concern for their acceptability and uptake. We briefly review the security of second generation mobile
phones and then discuss security architecture proposed for 3G phones. The new security issues that are
of importance because of the combination of their advanced capabilities and limitations are discussed.
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Abstract

are (i) conjidentiality andprivacy of communication, (ii) authentication of information and (iii) correct billing.

We briefly review security of the second generation mobile
phones and then discuss security architecture proposed for
the third generation phones and the new security issues that
will be of importance because of the combination of their
advanced capabilities and limitations.

The two widely adopted mobile phone systems are GSM
and CDMA (and also TDMA).

GSM
The aim of GSM has been to make the system as secure
as the public switched telephone network. With this goal
security mechanisms prevent unauthorised network access
and impersonation of subscribers, and protect confidentiality (preventing eavesdropping) and privacy (tracking of the
user based on his/her phone signal) of the mobile users. In
GSM system, a smart card will be the Subscriber Identity
Module ( S f M ) that is used to identify the subscriber. GSM
system uses this information and a challenge-response protocol to authenticate the user, and an algorithm called A5
to encrypt the communication. The system has databases
that contain administrative information and the current location of e x h active subscriber in the network. To prevent
the user’s identity to be revealed, or his calls to be linked,
the user will receive a different temporary identity by the
system in each call. However the user’s identity information and location can always be obtained from the network
operator.

1 Introduction
Mobile phones are becoming an indispensable part of everyday communication. They provide the flexibility that is
needed by an increasing number of mobile work force, and
equipped with a wide range of advanced functionalities, are
predicted to overtake other forms of communication in near
future.
Third-generation (3G) mobile phones will have Internet
connection of high data rate and promise seamless connectivity for a free roaming user. They will provide an ‘always on’ Internet, and make a range of services, traditionally available on desktop computers, accessible to mobile
users, irrespective of their location. Providing adequate security for these phones and the services that they offer is a
central concern for their acceptability and uptake.
In this paper we first give a brief overview of security
features of second generation (2G) mobile phones and then
discuss security issues in 3G systems.

Cryptographic algorithms used in GSM were initially
kept secret with the aim of providing higher security. However they were gradually leaked or reverse engineered and
subsequently shown to be insecure. This includes encryption and authentication algorithms A3, A8, AY1 and AY2
[ 6 4 , 151.
CDMA/TDhrlA
In CDMA each user is assigned a unique code sequence
that is used to encode his signal and decode the signal
sent to him. The encoding process enlarges (spreads) the
spectrum of the signal and is therefore known as spreadspectrum modulation (SS).SS signals allow multiple access
to the communication channel because the receiver can dis-

2 Security in 2G Cellular systems
Security in cellular networks can be seen from the view
point of operators and customers. The main concern of the
operator is correct billing and ensuring that services cannot
be stolen. From customers’ view point, the requirements
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tinguish between the users who are assigned different codes.
SS is particularly attractive because it provides higher
security for air signals. It increases privacy because the
data can only be recovered if the code is known to the receiver. It also provides anti-jamming capability and low
probability of interception (LPI) because of wide spectrum
and low power.
Similar to GSM systems, CDMA systems provide user
authentication and encryption of data, but use different
cryptographic algorithms and protocols. Eavesdropping in
CDMA and TDMA is a lesser threat, because firstly the
eavesdropper must know the type of the system, TDMA
or CDMA, and secondly, in digital systems the voice is
vocoded and so the sound is not only digitised but also compressed.
Service Theft
The main concern of the cellular service providers is service theft. By far the cloning has been the most widely used
attack against mobile phones. It is easy to clone an analog
handset by simply using a scanner to learn the mobile phone
numbers of the handsets in the area, and the electronic serial numbers that go with them, and program these numbers
into another handset.
A number of protcctive measures are used [ 161. This includes laws against possession of scanning receivers, use of
personal identification number (PIN) that must be entered
before making a call, RFfirzgerprinfing to distinguish transmitters, challenge-response authentication, and finally cull
counting where the handset and the network both keep track
of the number of calls made by the handset and the number is checked before a new call is accepted. Combination
of the above technologies has effectively reduced cloning
fraud. However with the introduction of services that allow
purchase of the phones over the Internet, no real verification
of ID is possible and subscriberfraud has emerged as a new
type of fraud. One method of detecting fraud has been by
storing calling patterns of users and raising an alarm when
a new user has the calling pattern of a previously disconnected user. Another kind of fraud is subsidy fraud where
a phone whose cost is heavily subsided by a cellular carrier
is activated on a different network.

ficient usage of bandwidth and provision of new services.
3G networks will support both packet switched and circuit
switched data services.
The main two contenders for this standard that use
terrestrial radio transmission technologies (RTTs) are the
European-backed Universal Mobile Telecommunications
System (UMTS) and the US-backed cdma2000. Both systems use Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) technology for their radio interface.

To prepare, approve and maintain globally applicable
technical specifications and technical reports for third generation mobile systems, the Third Generation Partnership
Project (also known as 3GPP) was founded. The 3GPP
Technical Specifications and Technical Reports will form
the basis of standards of the partners [ 3 ] .
Software
Software technologies have been developed to effectively
use the Internet access provided by 3G phones.
An operating system for a mobile phone must provide
fast access to applications. It must be modular so that various modules can be added or removed depending on the
needs of the users, and it must be able to run on low power
and not to drain the battery.
Currently, there are four Operating Systems that have
been used widely in mobile devices: Palm OS, Windows
CE, GeOS and Symbian EPOC. The OS provides protection for the stored data, such as Address and Date Book in
Palm OS. Applications may provide their own security. For
example Microsoft Pocket Internet Explorer that is shipped
with a Pocket PC operating system supports encryption via
secure socket layer (SSL).
There are several development systems for mobile devices. Palm OS applications are mainly developed using C
language, although there are other development tools that
can be used by non-programmers [SI. Windows CE applications use Microsoft Software Development Kit (SDK).
GeOS and Symbian EPOC have their own SDK.
WAI”
Wire!ess Application Protocol, WAP for short, is based on
XML and HTTP and allows many lower network layer protocols, such as SMS or CDMA (3G) to deliver their content.
To make WAP to work with existing HTTP servers, a WAP
gateway is required. The gateway translates the communication between the server and the handset. That is, it converts the queries sent by the handset into appropriate HTTP
format handled by the server, and in reverse translates the
HTTP responses sent to the host into a compact binary format understandable by the WAP client. The WAE (Wireless
Application Environment) User Agent which resides on the
WAP client uses WML (Wireless Markup Language) as the
format to display the content.

3 3G Systems - An Overview
The 3G standardisation process started in 1995 when the
International Telecommunication Union (ITU) began developing IMT-2000 (International Mobile Telecommunications for the year 2000). The main requirements of the
IMT-2000 include support for a data rate of 144 kbls for
users in motor vehicles moving fast over large areas, 384
kbls for pedestrians and 2.048 Mbls operation for office use.
Moreover, i t must provide voice quality comparable to that
of the public switch telephone network (PSTN), more ef-
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4 Security in 3G Systems
A 3G mobile phone resembles a desktop computer directly connected to the Internet. In has capabilities of
the desktop without any protection provided for a desktop
through the LAN connection and the firewall systems that
protect the LAN from outside world. The phone it is directly connected to the Internet.
Security becomes particularly important because data
connection is always on and the phone can be subject to
attack at any time. The risk of all time open connection is
similar to attacks mounted on hosts connected to the Internet. An unprotected connection can be used by malicious
hackers to access data stored on the host, and/or run malicios codes to use the storage or computing power of the host
for a range of attacks and unauthorised usages. The dam-’
ages that can be caused by malicious codes, such as viruses
and worms, become more pronounced because of the vast
reach of the phone through the Internet and other wireless
devices.
One of the main challenges in securing the system is the
physical, and hence computational, limitations of a handset that puts severe limits on the choice of security algorithms that can be used. Moreover many applications require fast response time which puts yet another restriction
on the kind of algorithm that can be used. On the other hand
some services such as Internet banking or access to medical
databases require a very high level of security. It is the combination of these factors, that makes provision of security a
very challenging task.
The Third Generation Partnership Project (3GPP) working party on security has proposed a security architecture
for 3G mobile phones [ 13. The security enhancement compared with 2G systems are introduced because of ( I ) combination of known attacks on cellular phones and those on
hosts connected to the Internet, (2) increasingly sophisticated software and devices used by attackers and (3) lack of
physical security in some network elements. The security
architecture defines five feature groups where each group
achieves certain security objectives. The attacks counteracted in the proposed architecture include eavesdropping,
impersonation of the user and the network, man-in-themiddle attack, and compromising authentication vector. In
[ 2 ] a range of attacks on the system is considered and the
protection offered by the architecture is evaluated with the
conclusion that with correct implementation and configuration of the proposed architecture the majority of the attacks
can be prevented. Because of the reach and functionality of
mobile phones, defining a clear security policy and controlling access to resources is of the highest priority. Another
important security risk to the phones is through the management and control subsystem. 3G network elements must
support remote management and communication with other
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systems such as billing system which would be ideal targets
for attacking, the system. The nodes must be sufficiently
protected anti detailed security log for after-the-fact investigation must be planned. Another major risk area is the inter
network security where signalling systems with plain messages for transfer of various kinds of information are used.
Subverting these messages could result in complete collapse
of the system and so control messages must be carefully secured.
Authentication protocol proposed by 3GPP
In 3GPP pro!posal, a new block cipher algorithm called Kasumi [ 101 is used. Kasumi is based on one of Matsui’s proposed algorit.hms, Misty, and has a 128 bit key. Misty has
been a public algorithm that has withstood public scrutiny
for some years.
The basic authentication is performed by VLR (Visitor
Location Register). The HLR (Home Location Register) is
replaced by Home Environment (HE) and the SIM is called
the UMTS SlM (USIM). As in GSM, the HE chooses a random challenge RAND and encrypt it with the U S I M authentication key K to generate a response R E S , a confidentiality key C K , an integrity key I K , and an anonymity
key A K . The relation among these entities is

There is also a sequence number SEQ that is known to
the HE and the USIM. A MAC (Message Authentication
Code) is computed on R A N D and SEQ and the sequence
number is masked by exclusive or-ing it with the A K . The
challenge RAND, the expected response R E S , C K , I K
and the masked sequence number are made up i n t o an autherzticution vector AV which is sent from the HE to the
VLR. Next, VLR sends ( R A N D ,niasked SEQ, h/IAC)
to the mobile station, and the mobile station computes the
response and the keys, unmasks the SEQ, verifies the
M A C , and if it is correct, returns the response RES to the
VLR.
Security in OS and WAP
Capabilities such as viewing and playing multimedia information in real-time, and/or performing complex transactions require high level of functionalities and support in
the handset. Securing stored information requires access
control mechanisms similar to what is offered in the operating systems. Protections offered by Palm OS and Window
C E and possible attacks on them are good examples of OS
security in future 3G systems.
WAP provides a layered architecture [9] with security
layer called WTLS (Wireless Transport Layer Security). A
WAP gatewxy uses WTLS to provide privacy, integrity and
authentication between itself and a WAP browser client.
WTLS provides the functionality of a strong Internet security standard over a wireless airlink and is based on TLS 1.O
(Transport Layer Security) which is in turn based on SSL

by the protocols must be carefully taken into account.
In some high security applications user authentication
must be end-to-end and so obtaining the agreement of the
bank, the cellular provider and the handset on the same solution is required. This adds a new dimension to the secure
implementation of the system.
Securing Multimedia Services
High bandwidth and fast data transfer enable 3G mobile
phone to support multimedia information and so provide
a wide range of services such as CD-quality music, video
information and multi-user games.
Processing multimedia information in real time and on
limited bandwidth and highly constrained computational
environment of a cell phone requires sophisticated coding methods and powerful signal processing techniques.
Adding security to the multimedia delivery systems, adds
a new dimension to the complexity of the system and demands specially designed algorithms to provide adequate
security and at the same time reasonable quality that is
adjustable to the capabilities of the receiving device. In
many applications, multimedia information are copyright
protected. This means that the cell phone not only has to
provide access control but also handle watermarking systems that are proposed for the protection of copyright. A
possible solution would be combining two or more functionalities in an attempt to reduce the computation cost. For
example combining encryption and compression into onc
system, instead of conventional method of encrypting compressed data and effectively applying the two processes consecutively, could result in less overall computation. However the combining operation must be carefully analysed so
the performance (compression and security in this case) of
the system is not drastically affected. We note that a requirement of encryption algorithms is that they do not sprcad
channel error. This is because multimedia information is
firstly compressed and then encrypted and so if the encryption algorithm spreads channel error the decompressed signal will become completely unintelligible.
Billing and Electronic Payment
In 3G systems, one of the main challenges comes from the
fact that it is not necessary to bill on a “per minute” basis.
Packet switching means that users will be charged by the
amount of data they send and receive and not by the time.
Small prices add up to the phone bills. DoCoMo’s customer
pay around 4.2 yen for a 250-character email message and
14.7 yen for a news item. Companies providing the service pay 9 per cent of the revenue. Services such as above
require very small amount of money to be paid electronically. This requires electronic payment systems that allow
a customer to freely move in the cyber world and purchase
without the need for a prior account to be setup, while the
cost of payment is only a small fraction of the actual purchase. The system must ensure that the risk to the merchant

3.0.
WAP gateway uses SSL to communicate securely with
a Web server over the Internet on one side, and takes SSLencrypted messages from Web and translates them for transmission over wireless using WTLS. It also converts messages form the handset from WTLS to SSL. The WTLS
protocol uses digital certificates to create a secure communication pipe between a mobile phone and a WAP server.
When Alice visits a site secured by a WTLS, her microbrowser sends a message to WAP server requesting a session. The WAP server sends its signed certificate, which is
verifiable by Alice’s handset that has stored the public key
of the certificate authority. Alice’s micro-browser generates
a key which is encrypted by the server key and is sent to the
server. Now micro-browser and the server can communicate encrypted messages using their shared key.
In some applications that work across many wireless
networks, content must remain encrypted from the time it
leaves their application server until it arrives at the WAP
handset. During translation between SSL and WTLS, messages will become in plaintext form and can be exposed.
Care must be taken in the design of translator to minimise
the threat. WTLS goes beyond TLS 1.0 and offers such
features as datagram support, dynamic key refreshing and
optimised handshake [ 141.

5 New Security Services and Risks
3G phones will enable a range of new services and will
rise many new security concerns. In the following we outline a number of emerging risk areas of risk that either did
not exist in 2G systems or the level of risk attached to them
was an order of magnitude lower, because the 2G systems’
limited functionalities.
User authentication is the first step in securing a mobile
system and forms an integral part of security in all 2G systems. In 3G systems, authentication requires a considerably
higher level of assurance. This is because the phones support many more complex and security critical applications
such as Internet banking and access to databases of sensitive information (for example, medical databases). Biometric technologies for user identification offer a high level of
assurance and combined with other authentication methods
such as PIN nutnber can guarantee the required security.
In [ 181 a fingerprinting technology for verification of user
identity is proposed. A sensor embedded in the surface of
the cell phone captures an image of user’s fingerprint which
is analysed and converted into a unique representation of the
user’s fingerprint and stored in the phone and at a later stage
use to identify the user. Combination of biometric methods
and cryptographic user identification protocols could provide a very high level of security. Again, limitations on
computational power of the handset and delay introduced
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remains ‘controlled’, that it highly unlikely to be above a
specified limit.
The phone will also be used for medium valued purchases from e-shops and also high valued Internet banking
which may involve transfer of large sums of money. That is
the full range of electronic payment mechanisms, including
credit card, electronic cash and micro-payment, in a computationally restricted environment must be implemented.
Again, the challenge in this case is the implementation of
protocols which provide a high level of security in an environment with strict limitation on computational resources.
Position Fixing and Big Brother
Position information allows provision of useful services
such us finding the location of the closest petrol station or
restaurant, when a user visits an unknown place. Analysts
believe that location fixing will open-up a multi billiondollar market. A number of competing technologies have
been proposed. Adding a Global Positioning System (GPS)
chip and an antenna to the mobile phone will give accurate
position information but it might not work if walls or car
roof block direct communication. Server-aided GPS allows
position fixing from anywhere, and also reduces the problems of extra weight and power of the mobile by shifting
most of the processing to the server. There are earthbound
techniques that measure the distance between a mobile and
3 base stations and use that to locate the mobile.
The main concern with using position fixing is the potential to breach privacy. For example a car equipped with
position fixing devices for protection against theft, can be
potentially used in an invasive way to track people’s movement. In some systems, such as GPS, position can be found
without any data recorded by the system while in others
such as the earthbound systems users must trust the network operator not to track them. It is also worth noting
that finding positions might be invaluable in tracing criminals and so mechanisms that provide accurate position fixing in lawful situations are required. Cryptographic systems
with revocable anonymity where identity information can
be recoverable under specified conditions have been studied in the context of electronic payment systems. Similar
approaches can be adapted to location fixing to allow restricted anonymity while providing accountability for mobile users.
All-time Connectivity (“always-on”)
‘All-time connectivity’ and high functionality will inevitably mean an increased risk of attack by mobile viruses
and worms as well as malicious hackers. Malicious codes
may be embedded in mail attachments, or be inadvertently
downloaded with other data from a Web site. Even in the
very short life of hand-held devices a number of viruses
and worms for hand-held devices have already been written. Liberty Crack, first released on an Internet Relay Chat,
was a Trojan Horse: it looked harmless but included mali-

cious code [ 1 I]. Malicious code can not only wipe out data,
applications and the operating system, but can also infect
software to keep Liberty Crack from spreading to PCs, and
from there to hand-held devices.
Viruses infection can spread in many ways: for example
through sharing a removable storage cards, infrared transmission, or through an email attachment. In June 2000 a
hacker attacked DoCoMo mobile phones an email message
containing a malicious script. The message claimed to be a
test and asked a question and when the user answered ‘yes’ ,
a script Was run that dialled 110 which is the emergency service. In the same month Timofonica, a Visual Basic script
worm attacked cellular phones in Spain. The worm spread
via attachment to email messages sent to PCs. From a PC it
sent an email that was receivable by a mobile device. When
the victim opened the attachment it changed the devices registry. In the: next boot of the system the worm erase the system information and leave the device unable to boot again.
Protecting against Device Theft
One of the main differences between a desktop computer
and a 3G rnobile phone when providing protection for the
system, is threat to physical security. A mobile phone can
be easily stolen or even lost. This requires provisions to
ensure the secrets and data stored in the device are protected
and cannot be mis-used.
In particular identity information stored in the device
cannot allow an attacker to impersonate the owner and misuse his privileges. Using multiple source identity verification metholds, that is, requiring more than one piece of evidence to prove identity could limit the attacker. That is
the secrets stored in the mobile must be complemented with
other secrei. information, such as fingerprint or PIN, to form
the full identity.
Today SIM identifies users to the phone system. In future
i t may act as a universal identification card. Loss of a phone
must safely lock up the secrets stored in it. A solution is
to store imlportant information on secure servers and make
them accessible via WAP connection. The SIM will only
store a personal identifier which is the private key of the
user and is protected by the PIN. The card will shut itself
if wrong numbers are keyed in three times. To switch it
back on, the owner must take it to the police station. A
private key will replace hard-to-remember logins passwords
for websites as well as credit cards and pins.
Important data in the mobile must be kept in encrypted
forms however this will increase the access time of the
owner and puts extra load on the processor. Protection of
resident data must be provided without affecting performance of the mobile.
Physical Liniitation and Implementing Security
A successful security technology for mobile phones must
satisfy the following requirements.
Security processes must not, (i) delay to the call set-up
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6 Conclusion

and subsequent communication, (ii) increase channel bandwidth, (iii) increase the effective error rate of the communication, and (iv) add complexity in operating the device.

Securing 3G mobile phones is a daunting task. Combination of advanced functionality and vast reach through the
Internet and create an ideal medium for attackers to infiltrate
computer systems and networks without being tracked. On
the other hand, acceptability and take-up of the advanced
services that could be supported by these phones will ultimately depends on providing assurance about the security.
These factors make provision of security of highest priority
in 3G systems.

Mobile devices have limited computational power and
memory. Currently, mobile devices are equipped with
around 2 - 32 MBytes RAM to store the data and processors ranging from Motorolla EZ Dragonball with 16 MHz
(for Palm OS) to Intel embedded 386 processor. This means
that traditional cryptographic algorithms takes a long time
which could not only add unacceptable delay to the communication but also drain the battery of the mobile.
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